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In this paper, we present a survivability evaluation model and analyze the performance of
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) under attack and key compromise. First, we present a
survivability evaluation model of WSNs by representing the states of WSNs under attack.
Here, the survivability ofWSNs is expressed as a continuous timeMarkov Chain to describe
the status of realWSNs.We propose a threshold condition to trigger the transition between
the states of WSNs in the face of DoS attack. According to the threshold conditions, the
survivabilitymodel is capable of taking action(s) and enables the formalization of the effect
of action(s). We present an analytical model and numerical analysis to show the feasibility
of our work in terms of availability, survivability, and cost.
Second, we present a survivability model and evaluation of WSNs under key
compromise. Sensor nodes in a network can be captured by an adversary. The compromised
node can be identified by one of the intrusion detection mechanisms. After detecting the
compromised node, the key in the node has to be revoked. In this paper, we present
the effect of key compromise and key revocation in WSNs. We additionally present a
survivability evaluation model using the SHARPE simulation tool in terms of availability.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Smart environments represent the next evolutionary development step in building, utilities, industrial, home, shipboard,
and transportation systems automation. Recent advances in wireless communications and electronics have enabled the
development of low-cost, low-power, multifunctional sensor nodes that are small in size and communicate untethered
over short distances. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are composed of a large number of sensor nodes that are densely
deployed either inside the phenomenon or very close to it. These tiny sensor nodes, which consist of sensing, data processing
and communicating components, leverage the idea of sensor networks. The position of the sensor nodes in a sensor network
does not need to be engineered or predetermined. This allows random deployment in inaccessible terrains or disaster relief
operations. On the other hand, this also means that WSNs protocols and algorithms possess self-organizing capabilities.
Another unique feature of sensor networks is the cooperative efforts of sensor nodes. Instead of sending the raw data to
the nodes responsible for data accumulation, they use their processing abilities to locally carry out simple computations
and transmit only the required and partially processed data. The importance of WSNs can be gauged by the number of
recent funding initiatives, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) SensIT (Sensor Information
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Technology) program [1], military programs, and NSF Program Announcements [2]. Sensors cooperatively monitor physical
or environmental conditions such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion, distance or pollutants, at different
locations [3,4]. The development of WSNs was originally motivated by military applications such as battlefield surveillance.
However, WSNs are now used in many civilian applications, including environment and habitat monitoring, healthcare
applications, home automation, and traffic control. However, WSNs face several problems, such as limited energy, data
redundancy, reliable communication channel and computation constraints, resource constraint, and easy exposure to
adversary characteristics in WSNs raise challenges to the survivability of WSNs, requiring further research. In this paper,
we present a survivability model and an evaluation of WSNs under attack and key compromise. By the survivability model,
we mean a system’s capability to fulfill its planned activities by providing continuous service in the face of intrusions,
attacks, accidents and failures. In typical application scenarios, sensor nodes are spread randomly to collect sensor data,
depending on the query. Sensor nodes in WSNs are usually deployed in hostile environments, and sensor nodes should
continue to supply their intended service in a timely manner even though they are under attack or have been compromised
by adversaries, which is detected by the Intrusion Detection System (IDS). This is considered to be a survivability problem in
wireless networks. The survivability of conventional networks, aswell aswireless networks has been considered a significant
issue. The survivability of a network is concerned with the ability of the network to provide a defined degree of assurance
that the systemwill continue to function as normal during and after a natural orman-made disturbance [5]. The survivability
of a system can be defined as the capability to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of intrusions, attacks,
accidents and failures [6]. With the growing interest in and emphasis on WSNs and their increasing deployment and use
for real-world applications, it is important for such networks to possess the capability to overcome failures and provide
survivable services. Hence, it is critical to guarantee the survivability of WSNs. As sensor nodes have very limited power
supply, sensor nodes should be configured using a backup power supply, in the case of power failure. For sensor node’s
survivability, we need to reconfigure the sensor nodes by either replacing the power supply or switching to the new node.
So, the survivability of WSNs can be described as the capability to continue its service under different types of situations
and attacks. In this paper, we consider Denial of Service (DoS) attack. This survivability can be achieved in several ways.
The security mechanisms in sensor networks such as encryption algorithms, key management and authentication provide
the fundamental first line of defense for ensuring survivability. Survivable WSNs need to not only detect the misbehaviors
correctly and accurately in the presence of attacks or intrusion faults, but also ensure security in the face of such kinds
of attacks or faults. In this paper, we present a survivability model and evaluation of survivability under DoS attack and
key compromise, respectively. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the motivation and
contribution of our approach. Section 3 gives the background and relatedwork, and additionally outlines the shortcomings in
the existing literature from the perspective of modeling andmethodological approaches for survivability ofWSNs. Section 4
describes the survivability evaluation model with evaluation results. Section 5 concludes the paper and indicates future
directions for research.
2. Motivation and contribution
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are usually deployed in hostile environments, and sensor nodes should continue
to supply their intended service in a timely manner even though they are under attack or have been compromised by
adversaries. So, it is essential to provide a sensor node recoverymechanism inWSNs to ensure survivability. As sensor nodes
can be attacked by different kinds of threats or compromised bymany adversaries in hostile environments, it is important to
guarantee the survivability of sensor networks. But, there is no quantitative and qualitative survivability evaluation model
of WSNs in the existing literature. It is vital to assess the survivability of WSNs under attack. There is a probabilistic way to
evaluate the security of WSNs under key compromise in terms of connectivity and resilience only; however, no prior work
has produced a survivability models of sensor networks. This paper presents the first work of this type in the existing body
of literature.
The contributions of this paper to the existing are two-fold as summarized below:
1. Survivabilitymodel and evaluation ofWSNs under attack:Wepresent a survivabilitymodel forWireless SensorNetworks
(WSNs) in the face of attack. To achieve this, we propose a threshold condition to trigger the transition between the
states of WSNs in the face of DoS attack. According to the threshold conditions, the survivability model is capable of
taking action(s) and the survivability model enables the formalization of the effect of these action(s). Possible actions
could be software rejuvenation or reconfiguration, neither of which require additional hardware and are a cost effective
techniques. Analysis is undertaken using a stochastic model, the results showing the feasibility of our approach. We also
propose and present a rejuvenation rate condition to model the survivability of WSNs. By following these rejuvenation
rates, we will be able to make decisions at which rate the software rejuvenation will be effective for survivability. The
proposed approaches and its evaluation are presented in Section 4.
2. Survivability model and evaluation of WSNs under key compromise: A sensor network is generally designed for
deployment in open, unmonitored environments, that expose nodes to physical attacks. As a result, sensor nodes
are susceptible to different kinds of threats or can be compromised by many adversaries in a hostile environment.
This requires that, in the event of node capture by an adversary, the sensor networks have the ability to revoke
the cryptographic keys of the captured nodes, otherwise, the entire network’s operation may be compromised by an
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adversary that surreptitiously controls both the operation and communication of these nodes. The compromised node
can be identified by one of the detection mechanisms. After detection of key compromise, the key of the compromised
node needs to be revoked. In this work, we present a survivabilitymodel and evaluation ofWSNs under key compromise.
The survivabilitymodel can be expressed as a continuous timeMarkov Chain to describe the status of real wireless sensor
networks. We present this approach and evaluate it in terms of availability in WSNs in Section 4.
It is the first and only work of its type that takes a holistic approach tomodeling the survivability ofWSNs and subsequently
presents and validates a methodology for survivability of WSNs. As a case study, in this paper, we make use of key
compromise in WSNs for modeling survivability WSNs.
3. Background and related work
It is important that WSNs are able to continue functioning in the face of node failure or intrusion, a feature known as
survivability. A large body of research has been conducted on sensor network security but researchers have predominantly
focused on security in wireless sensor networks, in terms of confidentiality, integrity and authentication. Although a
small number of studies have investigated the survivability of WSNs, much research is needed in this area to ensure the
survivability of WSNs. Over the past few decades, a considerable number of studies have been conducted on survivability
of conventional networks [7,8]; however, these are infeasible since they do not consider the resource constraints on sensor
nodes in WSNs such as memory, processing power etc. Several studies [9,10] have been conducted on the survivability
of WSNs. However, they consider ‘survivability of WSN’ in terms of link connectivity and stability issues which are also
important to the survivability of WSNs, but they do not consider the issue of security. For the purpose of discussion
and review, we classify the existing literature on survivability into three classes based on the approach that they take:
(a) software rejuvenation (b) software reconfiguration (c) key management. In terms of existing literature, our approach
is an initial and sole contribution to modeling and designing survivable WSNs in the face of attack and key compromise.
Recently, Kim et al. [9] have proposed a survivability framework for WSNs, stating software rejuvenation could be applied
to WSNs [11,12]. Moon et al. [13] proposed task-role based access control (TBAC) for WSNs to improve the survivability
of WSNs. However, the approach requires additional information such as membership information of the node and the
task allocated to each sensor node. Chiang et al. [14] proposed an architecture that adopts duplicated hardware capable of
increasing the reliability and availability of WSNs, but redundant hardware incurs additional cost. Software rejuvenation
is a periodic preemptive rollback of a continuously running an application to prevent failures in the future [15]. It involves
occasionally terminating an application or a system, cleaning its internal state and restarting it. The effectiveness of software
rejuvenation has been proved in many applications, especially for enhancing the performance of mission critical systems.
The software rejuvenation technique has been used for years as a fault tolerant remedy for software aging and to effectively
minimize system downtime [15,5]. IBM Software Rejuvenation is a tool to help increase server availability by proactively
addressing software and operation system aging [11]. However, its use and evaluation in WSNs has not been investigated
in the existing literature thus far. M. Aung et al. [16] have adopted it in the security field and evaluated its feasibility in
terms of availability, survivability and cost. They mentioned that by selecting the policy improvement routine algorithm
for MDP, the expected cost could be minimized. However, the authors have not presented the evaluation of their approach.
Bapat et al. [17] proposed a protocol which enables one to reconfigure sensor networks through versionmanagement but, in
their proposed system, some of the fault monitoring and diagnosis procedures in WSNs are managed by a human operator
which is not always possible. Kogekar et al. [18] proposed dynamic software reconfiguration in sensor networks. They use
local detectors and correctors that can detect version inconsistencies and prevent their propagation in a timely and efficient
manner. However, they have assumed static connectivity to be an essential requirement and this is not a valid assumption in
the case of WSNs [18]. An additional drawback of this work is that this approach needs different switching components for
different interfaces. The recent studies on software reconfiguration in WSNs show that our approach can be designed and
implemented in real WSNs. Alarifi et al. [19] diversified data and code segments for each sensor node by creating different
and obfuscated data and code segments for each node in the network.
Secure network programming is one of the recovery methodologies used in sensor networks [20]. Dutta et al. [20]
presented techniques that take into account the limited resources of sensor networks that can be used to secure existing
wireless reprogramming systems and allow recovery from Byzantine programs. SCUBA is one protocol for Secure Code
Update by Attestation in sensor networks [21]. This protocol enables secure detection and recovery from sensor node
compromise. This protocol is based on ICE (Indisputable Code Execution) and is able to detect and repair the compromised
node through code updates by offering a strong guarantee that the node has been correctly patched or detecting when
the patch failed. SLUICE is one of the code update protocols in sensor networks [22]. SLUICE is an extension to the
network reprogramming protocols that facilitates the secure dissemination of trusted program updates. SLUICE aims for the
progressive, resource-sensitive verification of updates in sensor networks by exploiting a single digital signature per update,
along with a hash-chain construction over pages of the update. However, none of these approaches show the survivability
and availability in WSNs.
Key management in sensor networks has two important aspects: key distribution which describes how to disseminate
secret information to the principals so that secure communications can be initiated, and key revocation which describes
how to remove secrets that may have been compromised. Key distribution refers to the task of distributing secret keys
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Table 1
Recovery mechanisms in sensor networks.
Techniques Approaches
Rejuvenation TinyOS
Buffer flushing
Reset
Rebooting
Data and code Obfuscated data and code segment
Reconfiguration Code update
Secure network programming
Secure code update by attestation
Secure dissemination of code updates
Secure and correct node recovery algorithm
Reconfiguration protocol Version management
Key management Key revocation Centralized key revocationDistributed key revocation
Table 2
Recovery mechanisms in sensor networks.
Authors Approaches Shortcomings
Jun Li et al. [26] Survivability model through simulations to mitigate attacks Cost is not considered.
Xueping Li et al. [27] A quantitative survivability evaluation model through
pre-distribution key management scheme
Communication overhead is not considered.
Jiang Zhongqiu et al. [28] Survivability evaluation model through Markov chain process This scheme is only cluster architecture based.
Chul Hyun Park et al. [29] Dynamic level session key revocation protocol No performance in terms of survivability is shown.
Gianluca Dini et al. [30] Authenticated key revocation protocol using symmetric ciphers No performance in terms of survivability is shown.
Chorzempa et al. [31] Self-organizing key management scheme Communication and storage overhead is shown
but the availability of WSNs is not discussed.
Yong et al. [32] Centralized key revocation scheme Performance analysis in terms of energy and time
is given, but there is no discussion of availability
and survivability
Our approach Survivability evaluation approach under attack and key
compromise.
A survivability evaluation model of WSNs is
proposed. Survivability and availability under both
centralized and distributed key revocation
schemes are measured.
between sensor nodes to provide communication secrecy and authenticity. Key revocation is just as important as key
distribution in sensor network key management for ensuring network reliability and survivability. Key revocation is the
task of securely removing keys that are known to be compromised. In contrast to key distribution, which has been studied
extensively in recent works [23–25], key revocation has received relatively little attention. This requires that, in the event
of node capture by an adversary, the sensor network has the ability to revoke the cryptographic keys of the captured nodes.
Otherwise, the entire network’s operation may be compromised by an adversary that surreptitiously controls both the
operation and communication of these nodes. Distributed revocation properties for WSNs and a protocol for distributed
key revocation have been proposed by Eschenauer et al. [24]. They added revocation session, voting and revocation decision
to the distributed revocation protocol. A centralized revocation scheme is proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [24] and the
distributed revocation scheme is proposed by Chan et al. [23]. But neither approach deals with the availability and cost of
WSNs. So, in this paper, we propose the use of key revocation coupled with software reconfiguration and rejuvenation in
order to guarantee the survivability of WSNs. The existing literature focuses on one of these approaches for survivability
and fails to present a holistic approach. In Table 1, we summarize the possible approaches of software rejuvenation,
reconfiguration and key revocation in sensor networks.
In Table 2 we summarize the previous works of survivability, availability and key revocation of WSNs.
Hence, it can be concluded from Table 2 that in the literature, several approaches have been proposed for ensuring
survivability of WSNs. The primary shortcoming here is that the existing models [27,26] do not consider the cost and
communication overheads. By this, we mean that these works give no indication of the overall cost of implementing these
approaches; this is important since WSNs have resource and computational constraints. Other existing researches [29,30]
focus on key revocation protocols in WSNs only to achieve WSN survivability. However, none of them proposes a complete
methodology for survivability evaluation using key revocation. Michael [31] and Yong [32] only consider key management
and a revocation scheme for self-organizing WSNs by showing communication and storage overhead of WSNs. Finally,
another major shortcoming is that there is little focus on the evaluation of availability of WSNs in the research.
In this paper, we propose a methodology for survivability evaluation of WSNs. This methodology has two major
advantages. First, we evaluate survivability evaluationmodel ofWSNs under attack by applying software rejuvenation in the
network. Second, we test the survivability evaluation model of WSNs under key compromise by applying both centralized
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Fig. 1. An example of cluster-based sensor networks.
and distributed key revocation techniques. We show our evaluation results using both mathematical calculation and the
SHARPE simulation tool.
4. Proposed approach for survivable wireless sensor networks
4.1. Preliminary
Network assumptions
We assume a cluster-based model for WSNs due to its advantages in terms of cost and energy [25,33]. A conceptual
example of the cluster-basedmodel is depicted in Fig. 1. The sensor nodes are deployed in some application fields. The sensor
nodes select a cluster head node and build several clusters based on the techniques [34,35]. The sensor nodes exchange
necessary keys to utilize security mechanisms applied in WSNs [36,19]. Each sensor node sends the collected data to its
cluster head node, and the cluster head node sends the collected data to the base station (BS). The BS is connected with the
access point to the legacy network such as the Internet or satellite communication.
The detailed assumptions in this section are as follows:
(i) Base stations are robust against attacks. Some securitymechanisms [37,38,33] for base station can be adopted to ensure
this.
(ii) Sensor nodes are vulnerable to attacks.
(iii) Sensor nodes are not tamper-resistant devices.
(iv) Sensor nodes are static after deployment.
(v) We perform state monitoring of a cluster (which consists of sensors) in the network to reflect the state of each cluster
through periodic or continuous monitoring.
(vi) We utilize one of the compromised node detection schemes [39–41] to determine the number of compromised nodes
in a cluster in the network.
Design goals
The design goals of our proposed methodology are as follows:
(a) First, we present a low level rejuvenation condition to describe the state of a cluster.
(b) Second, we present a high level survivability model to assess the survivability of sensor networks under attack, using a
stochastic approach which is described later.
(c) Third,weutilize one of actions based on software rejuvenation, software reconfiguration, and key revocation tominimize
the unavailability of sensor nodes in the network andmaximize the lifetime of sensor nodes in each cluster in the sensor
networks in the face of hello flood attack and key compromise in a timely manner.
Threat models
As mentioned previously, sensor networks are susceptible to a variety of attacks. In this work, we take into account the
Hello flood attack as a threat model. Hello flood attack [42] is a kind of Denial of Service (DoS) attack in sensor networks.
The countermeasure against Hello flood attack [42] is to limit the number of connections or to use client puzzles. Karlof
and Wagner [43] introduce secure routing mechanisms in sensor networks. They suggested that it is good to employ
authenticated broadcasting and flooding to prevent Hello flood attack. In this work, we propose a set of actions based on
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a combination of software rejuvenation and reconfiguration in the face of an attack in order to maximize the lifetime of
each sensor node in the network. Also, in this work we consider the problem of key compromise in WSNs. An adversary
can compromise a small number of nodes in WSNs. All data (shared keys) on a compromised node become known to the
adversary. An adversary could take control of the whole sensor network’s operations by using compromised nodes which
retain their network connectivity for extended periods of time. In this work, we propose a survivability evaluation model
using key revocation and we show how to remove keys that may have been compromised.
Threshold functions
In this section,wedefine a threshold function to find the compromisednode in the cluster level.Weassume the following.
- A sensor network’s topology is a cluster-based m tier architecture, where m = 1, 2, . . . .n and n is the integer. For
example, a 2 tier architecture is depicted in Fig. 1.
- There is a total N number of sensor nodes in the network, where N = 1, 2, . . . , n.
- There is a total K number of clusters in the bottom tier in the network, where K ≤ N, K = 1, 2, . . . , n.
- There is a total nc number of compromised sensor nodes in a cluster in the network.
- We define a threshold parameter t = N
αK to determine the state of each cluster.
- We also define a threshold regulation parameter α, describing the extent of the total number of compromised nodes in
a cluster in the network, which is possible to regulate according to the design requirement. Depending on this threshold
parameter, we will define the state of each cluster and according to the status, we will employ recovery mechanisms for
the enhancement of survivability in WSNs.
- There is an action set A = {a1, a2, . . . , al}, where each al represents an action to be taken against a certain type of attack.
- The status of cluster i out of a total K clusters in the network can be expressed as a state si.
4.2. Proposed approach for survivability modeling
4.2.1. System model
In this section, we present our proposed survivability model. Before we introduce this model, we explain why we use
multiple states within the stochastic model. This is really a general model used only for explanation purposes.
We take into account the following states of the network.
(a) First, we consider periodic monitoring with two states: normal or compromised state.
(b) Second, we consider a state transition model to model the transition of the network from one state to the other. We
need to specify the state of a cluster in the network and the state transition model assumes that each state is equivalent.
(c) Third, we consider statemonitoring using a probabilisticmodel.We assume that the state of a cluster in the networkwill
have a probability distribution (or just simple probability), and an outside event will trigger themovement of the cluster
from one state to the next and cause the states of a cluster to change through, for instance, attack and countermeasure.
The probability of the clusters remaining in a particular state under certain conditions as shown in Table 3. If wemonitor
the state of a cluster and later the number of clusters in the network periodically or batch mode, we will be able to
perform several countermeasures according to the information about the clusters’ state. Accordingly, we propose a
survivability model using a stochastic approach which can be used easily when we are concerned about the steady
state probability for the objective system.
Fig. 2 depicts a state transition diagram of a survivability model for a single cluster of sensor nodes in sensor networks.
Now, we present a lower level threshold function. The state si in the state transition diagram indicates the state of clusters
in the network. There are many factors which can affect the state of a cluster. For simplicity, we define that state can be
decided by both t and A where t represents a threshold parameter to express the percentage of compromised nodes in a
cluster in the network; and A represents the action set which has multiple actions (these are countermeasures) in it. The
state of each cluster can be expressed as follows.
A cluster in the network is in a healthy state (H) when at least several sensor nodes are functioning properly; the sensor
node stays in this state as long as possible until any known or unknown vulnerabilities are discovered. In this state, no action
takes place. Formally, this may be expressed as
0 < nc ≤ N
αK
and A = {}. (1)
A cluster in the network is in a compromised state (C) when the total number of compromised sensor nodes is more than
the threshold value. In this state, no action takes place. Formally, this may be expressed as
nc >
N
αK
and A = {}. (2)
A cluster in the network is in a response state (R) when an action based on software rejuvenation and reconfiguration
is performed as a countermeasure against attacks, for example, a response can be rebooting or resetting the compromised
node. After a successful response is performed, sensor networks go to the healthy state, otherwise, they go to the failure
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Legend:
Fig. 2. A state transition diagram of a cluster-based sensor network.
Table 3
Stationary probability of each state.
Probability Description
πh Probability that a cluster is in the healthy state
πc Probability that a cluster is in the compromised state
πr Probability that a cluster is in the response state
πf Probability that a cluster is in the failure state
state. In this state, we are able to take some proper action, according to the security policy in sensor networks. Formally,
this may be expressed as
nc >
N
αK
and A = {ai}. (3)
When responsemechanisms fail to provide the survivability of a cluster in the network, the sensor networks go to the failure
state. In this state, no action takes place. Formally, this may be expressed as
nc = NK and A = {}. (4)
Using these criteria (Eqs. (1)–(4)), the state of each cluster in the network can be decided and the state is applied to the
survivability model in Fig. 2.
4.2.2. Model analysis
State analysis of clusters in the network
In this section, we present several proof-of-concept scenario examples to help the understanding of the threshold
function and the proposed survivability model. Fig. 1 depicts a cluster based sensor network. It consists of three clusters in
which each cluster has a cluster head sensor node and sensor nodes. The assumptions for the following parameters would
be as follows:m = 1 (1 tier architecture), N = 15 (the total number of sensor nodes in the networks equals 15), K = 3 (the
total number of clusters in the network is 3), α = 2 (the threshold regulation parameter), l = 4 (the total number of actions
in an action set equals 4). Suppose that an action set A = {a1, a2, a3, a4} = {buffer_flushing, rebooting, code update, key
revocation}. We can measure the state of each cluster in the network and using the above parameters’ value and equations
from (1) to (4) above, we get a threshold parameter t = N2K = 152∗3 = 2.5. In the case of cluster 1, the total number of
compromised nodes in the cluster nc = 1, so that nc < t; hence, it is in the healthy state. In the case of cluster 2, nc = 3 and
nc > t , therefore, it is in the compromised state. The state of cluster 2 may change to the response state if the base station
takes an action out of the action set. If the action is effective for cluster 2, it changes to the healthy state; otherwise, it is in
the failure state. In the case of cluster 3, nc = 1, therefore, it is in the healthy state. However, this can cause a problem, since
the sensor header node is compromised, the cluster is actually in a compromised state. We adopt the vulnerability analysis
for sensor networks and developmore detailed threshold functions, showing that the simple threshold function enables one
to express the state of each cluster in the network.
Steady state analysis
We present a steady state analysis of a survivability model. An adversary’s behavior can be represented by the states
{H, C} and the system responses during and after attack by the states {R, F}. We denote the following parameters
summarized in Table 4 and the stationary probabilities of every state are summarized in Table 3.
The state transition diagram shown in Fig. 2 can be described by the Markov process. We then can derive the balance
equation by applying the theory that the rate (shown in Table 4), at which the process enters each state with the rate at
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Table 4
The parameters in stochastic approach.
Parameter Description
λc Compromised rate
µc Recovery from compromised rate
λr Response rate
µr Response service rate
λf Failure rate
µf Recovery rate from the failure state
Table 5
System operation parameters values.
System operation parameter Value
λc 1 time/h
λr 0, 1/15, 1/10, 1/5, 1/3 (per min)
λf 1 time/day
µf 2 times/h
1/µc 1 s
µr 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8,1 (per s)
Fig. 3. Availability vs. rejuvenation rates.
which the process leaves are equal. Combining the balance equations with the general equation
(πh + πc + πr + πf = 1) (5)
and solving these equations, we obtain the closed form solutions for the survivability model as follows
πc = λc
λr + µc πh (6)
πr = λr .λc
(λf + µr)(µr + µc)πh (7)
πf = 1
µf

λr .λc .λf
(λf + µf )(µr + µc) +
λc .µc
(λr + µc)

πh (8)
πh =

1+ λc
λr + µc +
λr .λc
(λf + µr)(µr + µc) +
1
µf

λr .λc .λf
(λf + µf )(µr + µc) +
λc .µc
(λr + µc)
−1
. (9)
The availability and survivability of sensor networks for the steady-state analysis using the Markov process can be
expressed as
Availability (A) = (1− πf ) (10)
Survivability (S) = Availability− πr . (11)
By using the operation parameters in sensor networks, we are able to obtain πh andwe can then calculate the probability
of nodes being in the compromised, response and failure state, in turn, for every sensor node in one cluster. According to
Eq. (11) above, the survivability of a sensor network depends on the probability that the clusters in the network remain in
the response state and failure state. We need to minimize both probabilities, that is, it is necessary to minimize the time
to perform the action(s) and the time the clusters are in the failure state. We calculate the availability, and survivability
using Eqs. (10) and (11). We randomly chose the values given in Table 5 depending on our system model. By executing the
equation using these random values, we obtain Figs. 3–6.
Figs. 3–6 show that if we apply rejuvenation, survivability and availability increase, and after reconfiguration, both
survivability and availability also increase even more and the system becomes more stable.
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Fig. 4. Survivability vs. rejuvenation rates.
Fig. 5. Availability vs. recovery rates.
Fig. 6. Survivability vs. recovery rates.
4.3. Modeling the survivability of WSNs under key compromise
As with all networks comprising geographically distributed nodes, communication security in sensor networks requires
the effective management of cryptographic keys. In contrast to traditional networks, key management in sensor networks
is particularly complex due to the large numbers of sensor nodes, the lack of a prior information about the deployment
topology of the network, the limited hardware capabilities of the nodes, and the constant exposure of nodes to capture by
an active adversary who could obtain key information.
Recent research on key revocation in sensor networks illustrates two different approaches with orthogonal properties;
i.e., a centralized approach (e.g. for the basic random key scheme [24]) and the distributed approach (e.g. for the random
pairwise scheme [23]). In the centralized approach, upon detection of a compromised node as described in Section 4.2.1, a
base station broadcasts a revocation message to all sensor nodes that need to remove the copies of keys to be revoked from
the compromised node. In distributed revocation for random pairwise per-distributed keys [23], revocation decisions are
made by the neighbors of a compromised node. The detailed detection process of a compromised node has been described
in 4.2.1. These neighbors vote to decide whether to revoke a given node and, if the vote tally exceeds a specified threshold,
revocation takes place. In contrast with centralized revocation, distributed revocation is faster, as it requires predominantly
local broadcast messages that are inexpensive, and prevent a single point of failure. These features are important since
compromised nodes must be sealed off and effectively disconnected from the rest of the network expeditiously. Actually,
distributed node revocation is useful due to its ability to eliminate compromised nodeswithout requiring a central authority
that might become an attractive attack target. Thus, distributed revocation improves reaction time after node capture and
overall system resilience. However, distributed revocation protocols aremore complex than centralized ones due to the fact
that any of the nodes executing the protocol may bemalicious and attempt to block or subvert the protocol. In the following
sections, we demonstrate the modeling of survivability of WSNs using node revocation for both centralized and distributed
processes using our proposed approach.
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N D BM Rv R F
ND N- Normal State
D- Detection
ND- Not-detection State
BM- Broadcast Message State
Rv- Revocation State
R-Reconfigure State
F- Failure State
Fig. 7. State transition diagram for centralized key revocation.
Table 6
The state name and description in stochastic model.
State name Description
Normal state (N) When at least one node is functioning properly, the node stays in this state as long as possible until any known
or unknown vulnerabilities are exposed.
Detection state (D) In this state, IDS detects whether the node is compromised or not.
Broadcasting message state (BM) Upon detection of a compromised node, a base station broadcasts a revocation message to all sensor nodes.
Revocation State (Rv) After receiving the revocation message, keys are revoked from the compromised node.
Reconfiguration state (R) After revocation, a new key will be assigned and sensor will be reconfigured.
Non-Detection state (ND) If IDS cannot detect a compromised node, the system goes to the failure state.
Failure state (F) If the compromised key is not revoked and IDS cannot detect the compromised node, then the system goes to
the failure state.
Table 7
Transition rate and its description in a stochastic model.
Parameter Description
λD Detection rate
λBM Message broadcast rate
λRv Revocation rate
λR Reconfigure rate
λF1 Failure rate from revocation
λND Failure rate
λF2 Failure rate from non-detection
µR Reconfigure service rate
µF Recover rate from failure state
4.3.1. Centralized key revocation
In the centralized approach, upon detection of a compromised node, as described in Section 4.2.1, a base station
broadcasts a revocation message to all sensor nodes that need to remove the copies of keys from the compromised node.
Depending on the key revocationmechanism employed in the centralized key approach, wemake the state transitionmodel
for the centralized key revocation scheme in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7 shows the generic and dynamic behaviors of sensor nodes in one single cluster when nodes are under the normal,
detection, message broadcast, revocation, non-detection and failure states which are stated in Table 6.
Depending on the model, we assume the system parameters and stationary probabilities of every state in Tables 7 and 8
respectively.
Combining the balance equations with the general equation
(πN + πD + πBM + πR + πF + πND = 1) (12)
and solving these equations, we obtain the closed form solutions for the model as follows:
πD = λD
λB
.πN (13)
πB = λD
λR
.πN (14)
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Table 8
Stationary probability of states and description.
Probability Description
πN Probability that a cluster is in the healthy state
πD Probability that a cluster is in the detection state
πBM Probability that a cluster is in the message broadcasting state
πRv Probability that a cluster is in the revocation state
πR Probability that a cluster is in the reconfiguration state
πF Probability that a cluster is in the failure state
πND Probability that a cluster is in the non-detection state
Table 9
Parameters and values for centralized revocation.
Parameter Value
λD ,λRv , λR 1 time/min
λBM 5 times/min
λF1 1 time/day
λND 1 time/h
λF2 1 time/2 day
µR 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 (per h)
µF 2 times/h
πR = λD
µR + λF1 .πN (15)
πND = λND
λF2
.πN (16)
πF = πN
µF

λDλF1
µR + λF1 + λND

(17)
πN =

1+ λND
λF2
+ λD
λR
+ λD
µR + λF1 +
1
µF

λDλF1
µR + λF1 + λND

+ λND
λF2
−1
. (18)
Here, we define that the system is available only except entering to the failure state. So, we define availability in equation
(19). Alsoweknow that the system is available to give service only expect entering to the failure state and the reconfiguration
state. So, we define survivability in Eq. (20).
We can compute the survivability and availability for this centralized approach as follows:
Availability (A) = (1− πF ) = 1− πN
µF

λDλF1
µR + λF1 + λND

. (19)
In addition,
Survivability = Availability− (πR + πF ). (20)
We calculate the availability, and survivability using Eqs. (19) and (20) respectively. We randomly chose the values
described in Table 9, according to our system model.
We validate our approach using SHARPE (Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability and Performance Evaluator),
which is a widely used simulator for measuring the reliability and performance of networks [44,45] in the field of reliability
and performability. It is possible to use different kinds of models hierarchically for different physical or abstract levels of
the system and to use different kinds of models to validate each other’s results. Steady-state and transient computations
are available in the tool. SHARPE allows its users to construct and analyze dependability, performance and performability
models. It gives users direct and complete access to the model types without making any assumptions about an application
domain. The evaluation results obtained through SHARPE are shown in Fig. 9. We use the system parameters in Table 9 and
execute the survivability for centralized approach using SHARPE and show the result in Fig. 9.
Fig. 8 shows that if we apply the revocation scheme, then survivability increases for WSNs. But if it takes a long time to
return to the normal state after the new key is assigned and reconfiguration has occurred, then the availability decreases.We
used the SHARPE tool to evaluate the viability of our approach, obtaining almost the same result bymathematical calculation.
Fig. 9 shows that the system availability decreases if it takes a long time to recover and come back to the normal state.
Comparative results are shown in Fig. 10.
4.3.2. Distributed key revocation
In distributed revocation for random pairwise per-distributed keys [23], revocation decisions are made by the neighbors
of a compromised node. These neighbors vote to decide whether to revoke the key of a given node and, if the vote tally
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Fig. 8. Survivability vs. revocation rate for the centralized approach.
Fig. 9. Availability vs. recovery rate by SHARPE tool for the centralized revocation.
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Fig. 10. Availability vs. recovery rate from SHARPE result and mathematical result for the centralized approach.
exceeds a specified threshold, revocation takes place. Based on the revocation process in distributed key revocation scheme,
the state transition model would be as shown in Fig. 11.
Fig. 11 shows the generic and dynamic behaviors of sensor nodes in one single cluster when nodes are in the normal,
detection, message broadcast, session delay, voting verification, revocation decision, reconfiguration, non-detection and
failure states which are stated in Table 10.
Depending on the model, we assume the system parameters and stationary probabilities of every state in Tables 11 and
12 respectively.
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N D BV VV RD REBD R F
ND
SD
N- Normal State
D- Detection
ND- Not-detection State
BV- Broadcast Voting State
SD- Session Delay State
VV- Voting Verification State
RD- Revocation Decision State
BD- Broadcast Decision State 
RE- Revocation Execution State
R- Reconfigure State
F- Failure State
Fig. 11. State transition diagram for distributed key revocation.
Table 10
The state and description in stochastic model.
State name Description
Normal state (N) When at least one node is functioning properly
Detection state (D) In this state, IDS detects whether the node is compromised or not.
Broadcast voting state (BV ) Upon detection of a compromised node, the neighbor nodes will send voting.
Session delay state (SD) If one sensor cannot vote in revocation session, then it will go to the session delay state.
Voting verification state (VV ) After collecting votes from all the neighboring nodes, the node will verify the vote. If it is greater than some
threshold value, then it will make a decision for revocation.
Revocation decision state (RD) After verifying the voting and comparing it with the threshold value, it will make a revocation decision.
Broadcast decision state (BD) After making the revocation decision, the node will send its decision to other neighboring nodes.
Revocation execution state (RE) The node will remove all the keys with the compromised node.
Reconfiguration state (R) After deleting the compromised keys, new keys will be assigned and then the node will be reconfigured.
Failure state (F) If the compromised key is not revoked and IDS cannot detect, then the system will go to the failure state.
Table 11
The parameters in stochastic approach.
Parameter Description
λD Detection rate
λBV Voting broadcast rate
λSD Session delay rate
λVV Voting verification rate
λRD Revocation decision rate
λRE Revocation execution rate
µRE Revocation execution service rate
µF Recovery rate from failure state
λF1 Failure rate from revocation execution
λF2 Failure rate from non-detection state
λND Non-detection rate
Table 12
Stationary probability of each state.
Probability Description
πN Probability that a cluster is in the healthy state
πD Probability that a cluster is in the detection state
πND Probability that a cluster is in the non-detection state
πBV Probability that a cluster is in the broadcast voting state
πSD Probability that a cluster is in the session delay state
πVV Probability that a cluster is in the voting verification state
πRD Probability that a cluster is in the revocation decision state
πRE Probability that a cluster is in the revocation execution state
πF Probability that a cluster is in the failure state
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Table 13
Transition rate and the value of each state.
Parameter Value
λD 1 time/min
λBV 5 times/min
λSD 1 time/h
λVV , λRD , λR ,λBD, λRE 1 time/min
µRE 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 (per h)
µF 2 times/day
λF1 1 time/day
λF2 1 time/2 day
λND 1 time/ h
Combining the balance equations with the general equation
(πN + πD + πND + πBV + πSD + πVV + πRD + πRE + πF = 1) (21)
and by solving these equations, we obtain the closed form solutions for the survivability model.
πD = λD
λBV
.πN (22)
πBV = λD
λSD
.πN (23)
πSD = λD
λVV
.πN (24)
πVV = λD
λRD
.πN (25)
πRE = λD
λR
.πN (26)
πRD = λD
λBD
.πN (27)
πBD = λD
λRE
.πN (28)
πR = λD
λF1 + µRE .πN (29)
πND = λND
λF2
.πN (30)
πF = πN
µF

λDλF1
µRE + λF1 + λND

(31)
πN =

1+ λD
λBV
+ λD
λSD
+ λD
λVV
+ λD
λRD
+ λD
λBD
+ λD
λRE
+ A
−1
(32)
where
A =

λD
µRE + λF1 +
1
µF

λDλF1
µRE + λF1 + λND

+ λND
λF2

.
In previous, we already give availability and survivability calculation explanation. We can compute the survivability and
availability for this distributed approach
Availability = (1− πF ) == 1− πN
µF

λDλF1
µRE + λF1 + λND

(33)
and the survivability
Survivability = Availability− (πRE + πF ). (34)
We calculate the availability, and survivability using Eqs. (33) and (34) respectively. We randomly chose these values
given in Table 13, according to our system model.
Fig. 12 shows that if we apply revocation for WSNs, then the survivability will increase.
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Fig. 12. Availability vs. revocation rate for the distributed approach.
Fig. 13. Availability vs. recovery rate using the SHARPE tool for the distributed approach.
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Fig. 14. Availability vs. recovery rate from SHARPE and mathematical result.
However, if it takes a long time to return to the normal state after the new key is assigned and reconfiguration has
occurred, then the availability decreases, as shown by the SHARPE results in Fig. 13.
As mentioned previously, in order to validate our approach, we use the SHARPE tool as described in Section 4.3.1. The
evaluation results obtained through SHARPE are shown in Fig. 13. Fig. 14 indicates that the SHARPE results andmathematical
results are almost the same. This shows the correctness and robustness of our proposed approach.
5. Conclusion and future work
In this work, we present two survivability models for WSNs: a survivability model and evaluation for WSNs under
attack, and a survivability model and evaluation for WSNs under key compromise. First, we present a survivability model of
WSNs using software rejuvenation and reconfiguration. In our approach, we show that if we perform software rejuvenation
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and reconfiguration in the face of attack, the whole sensor network will survive. Accordingly, we present a survivability
evaluation model to model and assess the survivability of wireless sensor networks. The survivability model is represented
and modeled as a state transition to reflect the status of real wireless sensor networks and to model the transition of the
WSNs fromone state to the other.We also present a rejuvenation rate condition inWSNs.We adopt a rejuvenation condition
to enhance the survivability ofwireless sensor networks in the face of attack. By following these rejuvenation rate conditions,
we will be able to decide the rate at which software rejuvenation will be applied. Accordingly, we present three different
classes to classify the benefits of rejuvenation. We also calculate the availability, survivability, downtime and cost. These
parameters will determine the rate at which software rejuvenation should be applied in order to ensure the survivability of
the wireless sensor network. We perform mathematical analysis to demonstrate the feasibility of our work.
Second, we present a survivability model that uses key revocation in WSNs. Sensor nodes can be attacked by different
kinds of threats or compromised by many adversaries in hostile environments. The compromised node(s) can be identified
by one of the node capture detectionmechanisms. After detection, the key is compromised, so it needs to be revoked. Hence,
we demonstrate in this paper how we can enhance the survivability of wireless sensor networks through node revocation.
We show the effectiveness of key revocation in ensuring survivability of WSNs in terms of availability.
In the future, for the key revocation scheme, we will perform network-wide security analysis of our proposed scheme
through simulation and detailed analytical methods. We will also investigate a single node software rejuvenation and
reconfiguration scheme for mission critical operations, based on a self healing concept and extend our work to overall
network level cooperation for time critical operations using software rejuvenation and reconfiguration.
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